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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 7715 
l\1cKINLEY SIMPSON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant makes no statement of facts in his brief. Con· 
sequently respondent deems it advisable to set forth the follow-
ing statement of facts as shown in the record. 
On January 28, 1951, during the nighttime, the defendant 
McKinley Simpson accompanied by James Nixon, Robert 
Clewis and Paul Perkins drove in Clewis' car to the Brewer 
Tire Company located on 1st South and 1st West in Salt Lake 
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City, Utah. Defendant and Perkins broke into and entered 
the tire company by forcing open the back door and breaking 
a small window in the back of the building. They took ten 
( 10) tires, loaded them into the car and drove to Pete 1v1igli-
acco's Tavern, located at 363 \Vest South Temple, where de-
fendant attempted to sell the tires to Mr. Migliacco (Tr. 45, 
46, 52, 53, 54, 55, 76, 79, 80, 81, 105, 106, 11.0 and 111). 
They also attempted to sell these tires to Henry Oliver the same 
night (Tr. 69, 98). 
Later the same night Paul Perkins and defendant returned 
to the Brewer Tire Company where they again entered the 
tire company to steal more tires (Tr. 56-84). This burglary 
was interfered with by the arrival of Special Officers Haskell 
Merrick and Jack Merrick (Tr. 56). The defendant and Per-
kins then ran out the back door, through an alley north, then 
west to 1st West, north on 1st West to the north side of South 
. Temple, leaving a clear trail of footprints in the snow (Tr. 
57, 81, 84 and 87). Defendant and Perkins ran into an 
alley parallel with South Temple proceeding east, turning 
south and coming out on South Temple where they sought to 
conceal themselves in the Utah Apartments (Tr. 57, 84, 85, 
87, 88, 90, 107, 112, 115, 116, 117.) 
Police Officers Jack Ivferrick and Wilbur Anderson fol-
lowed the two sets of fresh footprints in the snow from the 
rear door of the Brewer Tire Company, north then west to 1st 
West, north on Ist West to South Temple, north across South 
Temple and into an alley running east parallel to South Temple, 
then south to South Temple to the Utah Apartments where 
4 
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Otticer Jack Merrick arrested the defendant and Perkins (Tr. 
82, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90 and 91). 
The day following defendant's arrest, codefendant Nixon 
sold four (-I) of these tires to Henry Oliver. The day follow-
ing the sale to Henry Oliver, codefendant Nixon recovered 
the tires he had sold to "stache" them in an attempt to prevent 
detection because of the arrest of Perkins and the defendant 
(Tr. 68, 69, 70, 71). These tires were recovered by Police 
Officers D. F. Duncombe and \Vilbur Anderson with the aid 
of Henry Oliver (Tr. 47, 58, 94, 70, and 95). 
The defendant was convicted of second degree burglary 
in the District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah, from which 
conviction he appeals. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. THE COURT DID NOT COMl\HT ERROR BY RE-
CEIVING IN EVIDENCE STATEMENTS MADE BY A 
CODEFENDANT OR ACCOMPLICE, OUT OF THE PRES-
ENCE OF THE DEFENDANT THEN ON TRIAL. 
II. THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT CONVICTED 
SOLELY UPON THE UNCORROBORATED TESTIMONY 
OF AN ACCOMPLICE; THEREFORE THE COURT COM-
MITTED NO ERROR IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S RE-
QUEST FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT. 
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III. THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN RE-
FUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY TO VIE\V THE 
TESTIMONY OF AN ACCOMPLICE WITH CAUTION. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR BY RE-
CEIVING IN EVIDENCE STATE1\1ENTS MADE BY A 
CODEFENDANT OR ACCOl\fPLICE, OUT OF THE PRES-
ENCE OF THE DEFENDANT THEJ\T ON TRIAL. 
Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in admitting 
the testimony of Henry Oliver as to conversations between him-
self and James Nixon, an accomplice and codefendant, which 
took place the day after the alleged act of burglary (Tr. 69, 
98). Appellant objected to this testimony on the grounds that 
the conversation took place after the commission of the crime 
charged and outside the presence of the defendant then on 
trial. 
Appellant's theory in the instant case is founded on the' 
claim that the crime charged, burglary, was accomplished on 
the night of January 28th and ended with the arrest of the 
defendant the same night, and that therefore the testimony 
of the statements made by the codefendant was not admissible 
as against the defendant, Simpson. 
Respondent submits that, although m accord with the 
appellant's conception of the general rule that "under the 
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rules of evidence, declarations of a joint defendant made after 
the commission of the crime and in reference to it, in the 
absence of the defendant on trial are not competent," that rule 
is not applicable to the case at bar. 
If it can be shown that a common purpose, conspiracy or 
design of a criminal enterprise was in existence and pending, 
and its fulfillment was not accomplished, such statements, acts 
or declarations of a defendant may be used against a codefend-
ant where such statements were made in the furtherance of the 
common purpose, conspiracy or design of the criminal under-
taking. The trial record clearly reveals that such a conspiracy 
existed, viz. to burglarize the Brewer Tire Company and to 
wrongfully gain from the sale of these tires. 
There is sufficient proof in the record that the conspiracy 
existing between the codefendants was a continuing one and 
that the act of burglary was only a part of the general plan of 
the conspiracy in its entirety. Therefore, the testimony of the 
conversations of codefendant Nixon, while given after the 
perpetration of the primary object of the conspiracy, viz. the 
burglary of the Brewer Tire Company, was made in the fur-
therance of the over all conspiracy and common design rather 
than after the completion of the crime as alleged by the ap-
pellant. 
The evidence of record reveals that a conspiracy did in fact 
.:xist between the four codefendants, and does so without ref-
erence to any testimony of an accomplice or codefendant herein 
concerned. 
First there is the act of burglary itself. C. W. Brewer 
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testified to the manner in which entrance to the tire company 
was gained by defendant and Perkins. He testified also to the 
number and kind of tires stolen and identified them at the 
trial as exhibits A and B (Tr. 44-50). Further evidence of the 
breaking and entering was furnished by the testimony of 
Special Officer Haskell J\!Ierrick (Tr. 79, 80, 81). 
Defendant and codefendants, Clewis, Nixon, Perkins, 
were all identified and connected with this common plan, 
scheme, or conspiracy by the testimony of Henry Oliver, Pete 
Migliacco, and Officers Merrick and Anderson. Henry Oliver 
testified that Nixon, Clewis and the defendant were together 
in the car when an attempt was made by them to sell the tires 
to him (Tr. 69, 98). Pete Migliacco connected defendant 
with this crime by his testimony as to the two separate occasions 
when the defendant attempted to sell him the tires. The first 
time the defendant attempted the sale alone and the second 
time Mr. Migliacco testified that the defendant was not alone 
(Tr. 74 and 75) ~ Officers Jack Merrick and Anderson con· 
nected defendant and Perkins with this conspiracy. Both of-
ficers testified as to tracing the two sets of footprints in the 
snow from the rear door of the Brewer Tire Company directly 
to where these officers arrested the defendant and Perkins (Tr. 
84, 85, 87, 88, 90, 91). 
Pete Migliacco' s testimony that defendant approached him 
on two different occasions during the night of the alleged crime, 
once before the established time of the actual act of burglary 
and once after the established time of the actual act of burglary, 
strongly if not conclusively points out that a common plan, 
scheme, or conspiracy existed at that time between the code-
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fendants to burglarize the time company and to sell the stolen 
tires for wrongful gain (Tr. 67, 98). Mr. Brewer also testified 
that the Brewer Tire Company is the exclusive dealer of the 
particular type of tires identified as Exhibits A and B; that 
such white wall tires were scarce at the time, that a shipment 
of such tires had been received about 36 hours prior to the 
burglary and that none of this type of tire had been distributed 
by the company out of that shipment. A1so Mr. Brewer identi-
fied the tires presented in court as the type and kind stolen 
from his establishment. Police Officers Duncombe and Ander-
son identified these tires and testified as to their recovery, with 
the assistance of Henry Oliver (Tr. 47, 48, 70, 94 and 95). 
Respondent submits that the above testimony conclusively 
establishes the existence of a continuing design: plan or con-
spiracy between the four codefendants to burglarize the tire 
company and to sell the tires for wrongful gain. 
The testimony of Henry Oliver, to which objections were 
made by counsel for appellant and the admission of which 
appellant alleges was in error is set out on pages 66 to 71 of 
the transcript. Oliver testified that Nixon awakened him on 
the night of the alleged crime and stated that the defendant 
wanted to see him in the car; there, with Clewis and Nixon, 
defendant attempted to sell him tires. The following day 
Nixon sold four ( 4) tires to him. The day following the sale 
Nixon recovered the tires from him to "stache" or conceal 
them to prevent detection because the defendant and Perkins 
had been arrested. 
In the case of State v. Hill, 352 Mo .. 895, 179 SW 2d 712, 
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where the defendant had been convicted of the crime of em-
bezzlement the court held: 
" * * * the state (may) introduce evidence of state-
ments made by a participant in crime against another 
if the statements were made in furtherance of a con-
spiracy. The fact that the alleged statements were made 
after the crime had been perpetrated does not neces-
sarily render the statements inadmissible. * * * In 
State v. Priesmeyer, 327 Mo. 335, 37 SW 2d 425, loc. 
cit. 427, this court commented as follows: 
"If a conspiracy continues for any purpose such as 
disposing of the loot, the effecting of an escape, the 
concealing of the crime, the admissions of one con-
spirator would be admissible against another." 
The fact that a conspirator was under arrest at the 
time the statements were made is not always conclusive 
against the admissibility of the statements in evidence. 
However, statements of one conspirator cannot be used 
as evidence against another unless they were made in 
furtherance of the conspiracy. See 22 CJS Criminal Law, 
Sections 768, 772, 774, 777, Pages 1309-1320 incl. 
In People v. Lorraine, 90 Cal. App. ~.I 7, 265 P 893, where 
the defendant was convicted of the crime of grand larceny, 
the court held: 
" * * * The rule relating to the admissibility of the 
acts and declarations of coconspirators is well settled, 
and is to the effect that, where an unlawful enterprise 
. between two or more persons, either by direct or cir-
cumstantial evidence, every act or declaration of each 
member of the confederacy in pursuance of the original 
concerted plan and with reference to the common ob-
ject is, in contemplation of law, the act and declaration 
of them all, and is therefore original evidence against 
10 
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each of thein, and that every one who thus enters into 
a common purpose or design is generally deemed in 
law a party to every act which had before been done 
by the others and a party to every act which may after-
wards be done by any of the others in furtherance of 
such common design. * * * 
The common design of a criminal enterprise may ex-
tend, however, as appellant concedes, beyond the point 
of the commission of the act constituting the crime 
for which the alleged conspirator is on trial. (People 
v. Opie, 12 3 Cal. 294, 55 P. 989; People v. Mazurco, 
49 Cal. App. 275, 193 P. 164; People v. Holmes, 118 
Cal. 444, 50 P. 675; People Y. Rodley, 131 Cal. 240, 
63 P. 3 51) ; and, as declared in California Jurispru-
dence, vol. 5, p. 523. * * * 
In other words, whether or not the subsequent act 
committed is the ordinary and probable effect of the 
common design or whether it is a "fresh and independ- · 
ent product of the mind of one of the conspirators, 
outside of, or foreign to, the common design, is a 
question of fact for the jury * * *, and if there be any 
evidence to support the finding of the jury on this 
question, its determination is conclusive." 
In the case of People v. Suter, 43 Cal. App. 2d 444, 111 Pac. 
2d 23, the court held: 
" * * * It has been held that the common design of 
a criminal enterprise may extend in point of time be-
yond the actual commission of the act constituting 
the crime for which the accused is being tried, such as 
for the purpose of concealing the crime, securing the 
proceeds thereof, sharing or dividing the prgceeds of 
the crime or bribing or influencing witnesses, and con-
sequently evidence is admissible to prove acts com-
mitted after the perpetration of the crime for which 
11 
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the accused is on trial. Of course, it must reasonably 
appear that such acts were committed. in the further-
ance of the common design of the conspiracy. It must 
also be remembered that the question when the design 
is accomplished, abandoned or frustrated~ and whether 
the acts proved are a part of the design of the conspiracy 
are for the jury to determine from the facts and circum-
stances of each case and the nature and purpose of the 
conspira_cy. See Thompson tJ. State, 58 Ga. App. 593, 
199 SE 568; and People t'. Ross, 46 Cal. App. 2 385, 
116 p 2d 81. 
In State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 305, 120 Pac. 2d 285, the 
court held: 
The acts done by the conspirators in order to escape 
the consequences thereof, even though they at the time 
know that the conspiracy cannot continue, are never-
theless acts done in the furtherance of the conspiracy. 
The fact that this act was done after the time limit 
placed in the indictment does not make it inadmissible 
as long as it was in furtherance of the conspiracy. See 
also State v. Scott, 111 Utah 9, 175 Pac. 2d 1016, and 
State v. Inlow, 44 Utah 450, 141 Pac. 530. 
Respondent submits that the actions and conversations of 
Nixon on January 29th, as testified to by Oliver, a common 
design, plan or conspiracy having been proven by other testi-
mony, reveals· clearly that his actions were in furtherance of 
the overall general plan of the existing conspiracy. Under the 
above authorities, the testimony given by Oliver about Nixon 
recovering the tires from him after the sale to "stache" or con-
ceal them from the police to prevent detection, after defendant 
and Perkins were arrested, was admissible as against defendant 
then on trial (Tr. 70, 71). 
A review of the record in this case indicates that the ob-
12 
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ject of the unlawful scheme, enterprise or conspiracy was not 
only to secure the tires from the Brewer Tire Company but 
also to thereby gain from the sale of these illegally obtained 
tires. There being ample proof of the existence of a continuing 
plan or conspiracy, the evidence of acts and declarations oc-
curring after the accomplishment of the primary object, viz, 
the burglary of the Brewer Tire Company, is here admissible 
as being in furtherance of the general plan or conspiracy in 
its entirety. It was not prejudicial error to admit that evidence. 
II 
THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT CONVICTED SOLELY 
UPON THE UNCORROBORATED TESTIMONY OF AN 
ACCOMPLICE; THEREFORE THE COURT COMMITTED 
NO ERROR IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR 
A DIRECTED VERDICT. 
Section 105-32-18, Utah Code Annotated 1943, is cited 
by appellant as constituting the main basis for appeal and reads 
as follows: 
A conviction shall not be had on the testimony of 
an accomplice, unless he is corroborated by other evi-
dence, which in itself and without the aid of the testi-
mony of the accomplice tends to connect the defendant 
with the commission of the offense and the corrobora-
tion shall not be sufficient, if it merely shows the com-
mission of the offense or the circumstances thereof. 
It is respondent's contention that the evidence at the trial 
sufficiently corroborates the testimony of the accomplice. In 
the case of State t'. Erwin, supra., this court held: 
13 
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This Court has held this corroboration need not go 
to all the material facts testified to by the accomplice 
(State v. Stewart, 57 Ut. 224, 193 P 855); that the 
corroborative evidence need not be sufficient in itself 
to support a conviction; it may be slight and entitled 
to little consideration. People v. Lee, 2 Utah 441; State 
v. Spender, 15 Utah 149, 49 P ~·02. * * * 
On the other hand, the corroborating evidence must 
implicate the defendant in the offense and be consistent 
with his guilt and inconsistent with his innocence, and 
must do more than cast a grave suspicion on him, and 
all of this must be without the aid of the testimony 
of the accomplice. State v. Lay, 38 Utah 143, 110 P 
986; State v. Butterfield, 70 Utah 529, 261 P 804; State 
v. Park, 44 Utah 360, 140 P 768; State v. Kimball, 45 
Utah 443, 146 P 313; State v. Powell, 45 Utah 19 193, 
143 P 588; State v. Bridwell, 48 Utah 97, 158 P 710; 
State v. Baum, 47 Utah 7, 151 P. 518; State v. Frisby, 
49 Utah 227, 162 P 616; State v. Elmer, 49 Utah 6, 
161 P 167; State v. Gardner, 83 Utah 145, 27 P 2d 51. 
The corroborative evidence of an accomplice, unlike 
proof of corpus delicti, may consist in the admissions 
of the accused. * * * 
See Wharton on Criminal Evidence, 11th Edition, Volume 
2, Section 752, 753, 748, 746 and 754, pages 1257 to 1273 
inclusive. 
See also 25 ALR 886; 87 ALR 767; State v. TV ade, 66 Utah 
276, 241 Pac. 808; State v. Laris, 78 TJtah 183, 2 P 2d 242; 
State v. Carafes, 74 Utah 94, 277 Pac. 203; State v. Cox, 74 
Utah 149, 277 Pac. 972; People v. Derenzo, 46 Cal. App. 2d 
114, 115 P 2d 858; and People v. Negra .. 208 Cal. 64, 280 
Pac. 354. 
14 
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The record, entirely aside from the testimony of the ac-
complice, amply connects defendant with the crime and cor-
roborates that testimony. The record establishes that twice dur-
ing the night of January 28th the defendant went to Pete's 
Tavern, once alone and once with the codefendants, to obtain 
a buyer for the stolen tires (Tr. 74, 75, 105, 106 and 110). 
Both times the defendant displayed knowledge of where the 
tires were to come from and the same tires were later identified 
as those stolen from the Brewer Tire Company (Tr. 47, 48, 49, 
93 and 94). The possession of the stolen tires and defendant's 
assertion of ownership certainly are sufficient to establish the 
defendant's participation and connection with this offense. In 
Yeargin v. State, 54 Okla. Cr. 34, 14 P 2d 431, the court held: 
Where an accused person is found in possession of 
property taken from a place recently burglarized, that 
fact may be considered by the jury, along with all 
other circumstances, as tending to show that the one 
in possession committed the burglary. 
See also Robinson z·. State, 67 Okla. Cr. Rep. 8, P 2d 1082, 
and State v. Butterfield, 70 Utah 529, 261 Pac. 804; and State 
z:. Morris, 70 Utah 53~·, 262 Pac. 107. 
Police Officers Merrick and Anderson were able to follow 
two clear sets of footprints in the snow from the rear door of 
the Brewer Tire Company directly to where Defendant and 
Paul Perkins were arrested (Tr. 82, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 
91). 
Defendant in his own testimony admitted running from the 
officers to avoid arrest. Defendant also admitted going into 
15 
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the Utah Apartments on South Temple to avoid arrest, where 
he attempted to conceal himself (Tr. 107, 114, 11.5, 116, 117). 
The record also shows that during the course of defend-
ant's flight and attempted concealment he was observed with 
Paul Perkins by Officer Anderson who was following the foot-
prints (Tr. 87 and 88). 
Flight and concealment of defendant immediately after 
a crime has been committed is corroborative evidence of guilt. 
See 2 5 ALR 886, and Wha~ton on Criminal Evidence, Section 
748. 
Defendant was not convicted upon the uncorroborated 
testimony of an accomplice. His own testimony and the testi-
mony of· the police officers and others amply conect him with 
the crime and fully corroborate Perkins' testimony. 
POINT III 
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN REFUS-
ING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY TO VIEW THE TESTI-
MONY OF AN ACCOMPLICE WITH CAUTION. 
Appellant contends that the court committed error in re-
fusing his request for a cautionary instruction in regards to the 
testimony of an accomplice. Respondent submits that while 
such an instruction would have been proper, the trial court 
did not err in refusing such request especially where the sub-
ject had been amply covered by other instnlCtions. 
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General! y as to instructions of this type see Blashfield, on 
Instructions to Juries, Section 219, Page 487, which states: 
\X.'hile the cases are all agreed that it is a better 
practice to give the jury a caution of this nature, it is 
nevertheless held by the majority of decisions that it 
is merely "a rule of practice, and not a rule of law," 
and therefore a failure of the judge to give such an 
instruction of his own motion, or even a refusal to do 
so· on request, is not erroneous, or, if erroneous, is not 
a ground for reversal. 
Jones, on Evidence, 2d Edition, Volume 5, Section 2217, 
page 4233, states: 
Although it might ordinarily be regarded as an 
omission of duty for the judge to neglect so to instruct 
the jury, the decisions are to the effect that his refusal 
so to do is not reversable error, as the matter lies in 
the discretion of the judge. * * * 
There are numerous authorities and cases which point 
out that the court does not err in refusing such an instruction 
where the testimony of the accomplice is corroborated by other 
evidence in the case. 
The court in the case at bar gave the jury sixteen ( 16) 
written instructions for their consideration and guidance. Re-
spondent contends that the jury was sufficiently informed by 
these instructions and in effect was cautioned as to the testi-
mony of the accomplice by the instructions of the court Nos. 
10, 11, 12, and in particular Instruction No. 9, which reads as 
follows: 
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In judging the weight of the testimony and credi-
bility of any witness, you should keep in mind the bias, 
if any is shown, of such witness, his interest, if any, 
in the result of the trial, and any probable motive or 
lack thereof to testify as he does. You may consider his 
appearance on the witness stand, the reasonableness 
or lack thereof of his statements, his apparent frank-
ness and candor, or the want of it, his opportunity to 
know, his ability to understand, his capacity to remem-
ber, together with all of the facts and circumstances 
which have a bearing on the accuracy of his statements. 
You should also consider any contradictory evidence, 
and whether or not he contradicted himself, and evi-
dence, if any, pertaining to his character as to truthful-
ness and honesty, or the lack thereof, and from all the 
facts and circumstances given in evidence determine 
what weight and credibility you should give to the 
testimony of any witness. 
Other cases supporting respondent's contention are: State 
v. Gross ( 1948), 31 \X' ash. 2d 202, 196 P 2d 297; and State 
v. Bixby ( 1947), 27 Wash. 2d 144, 177 P 2d 689; State v. 
Troiani (1924), 129 Wash. 228,224 Pac. 389; State v. Simp.ron, 
119 Wash. 653, 206 Pac. 561; and People v. Rankin (1944), 64 
Cal. App. 2d 956, 153 P 2d 399. 
Respondent contends that the evidence sufficiently cor-
roborated the testimony of accomplice Perkins and no error 
was committed by the court in refusing to give the cautionary 
instruction requested. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, it is submitted that the evidence in this case 
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fully supports the verdict and that the lower court committed 
no error in refusing to direct the jury to acquit the defendant. 
The verdict should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted. 
CLINTON D. VERNON, 
Attorney General 
FRANCIS C. LUND, 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondents 
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